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PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION
AFFECTING EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSMISSION AND MARKETING OF
PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS IN CANADA:
AN OVERVIEW AND COMMENT*
PETER A. CUMMING**
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief historical overview of
federal and provincial legislation affecting exploration, development,
transmission and marketing in Canada with respect to petroleum and
natural gas. This will be done within the context of identifying the de-
velopment of current major energy policy issues, with particular refer-
ence to the federal government's National Energy Program (NEP), an-
nounced October 28, 1980, and the subsequent "Energy Pricing and
Taxation Agreement" between Alberta and the federal government Sep-
tember 1, 1981.
Let me say at the outset that some people will disagree with a good
deal of what I say. My response is that we are talking about issues in
respect of which there is a great deal of rhetoric and posturing on all
sides, and that my perspective is not beholden to any particular partici-
pant in the current energy debate. I think it especially important for the
participants from the United States to see the issues identified clearly.
There is one underlying basic issue in Canadian energy policy to-
day: revenue-sharing on rising prices. Virtually every other issue is a
manifestation of this basic question. The revenue-sharing question is
present due to the historical nature of Canada as a federal state, and the
resolution of the question will profoundly influence Canada's future as a
federal state. In analyzing the problem, one must necessarily convey his
own vision of Canada as a nation-state-past, present, and future.
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is footnoted according to Canadian citation form based on
the extensive use of Canadian materials in the article and the anticipated use of the article
by the Canadian Bar. Citation form follows J. A. YOGIS, I. M. CHRISTIE, LEGAL WRITING
AND RESEARCH MANUAL (2d Ed. 1974).
* This article is based on a presentation given at the International Energy Development
Conference, April 7, 1981, at Brigham Young University but has been updated to include
consideration of the September 1, 1981, Memorandum of Agreement between Canada and
Alberta regarding Energy Pricing and Taxation.
** Peter A. Cumming is Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law School of York
University, Toronto, Canada.
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CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL CONTROL
The British North America Act of 1867' (B.N.A. Act) together with
later amendments is Canada's Constitution. As you may know, we are
presently going through a process of constitutional reform, with consti-
tutional amendments (in particular, a Charter of Rights) being consid-
ered by the present Parliament.2 Although constitutional reform contin-
ues to be extremely controversial from a political standpoint, the
legality of the federal government's approach has been recognized by the
Supreme Court of Canada.$' If constitutional reform is completed in the
form of the amending bill, the existing B.N.A. Act will be known as the
Constitution Act, 1867. Its provisions will remain, but with additional
provisions which relate to natural resources in the Constitution Act,
1981.
The basic scheme of the present B.N.A. Act is to leave powers to
deal with matters of a national interest with the federal parliament and
matters of local concern with the ten provincial legislatures. The critical
point in respect of this division of mutually exclusive powers between
Parliament and the provincial legislatures is to determine where a given
matter falls. A power that comes within one class, say a provincial
power, cannot be within another class, that is a federal power, and vice-
versa. For the sake of brevity, let us consider this division of jurisdiction
by considering how the oil and gas industry operates from a functional
standpoint.
Ownership of natural resources within provincial boundaries is left
with the provinces,8 and legislative competence to manage and sell pub-
lic lands belonging to the provinces rests with the provinces.4 As the two
main producing provinces entered Confederation fairly recently and did
not receive a transfer of natural resources until 1930,6 the bulk of re-
sources are still under provincial public ownership and are not privately
1. 30 & 31 Vict. C.3 (U.K.) hereinafter cited as B.N.A. Act.
2. Proposed Resolution for a Joint Address to Her Majesty the Queen respecting the
Constitution of Canada. Annex A contains the proposed "Canada Act."
2.1. In The Matter of references concerning the effect and validity of the amend-
ments to the Constitution of Canada sought in the 'Proposed Resolution for a Joint Ad-
dress to Her Majesty the Queen respecting the Constitution of Canada', decided on Sep-
tember 28, 1981. The divided Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the proposed resolution
affected provincial powers. It further ruled, in the quintessential Canadian compromise,
that amendments which affect provincial powers constitutionally do not require provincial
consent but conventionally do. In other words, the resolution is legally but not politically
acceptable.
3. B.N.A. Act, supra, footnote 1, s.109.
4. Id., s.92(5).
5. Both Alberta, with 86.5% of Canada's oil and 84% of the country's natural gas,
and Saskatchewan, with 9.6% of Canada's oil in 1905.




The third main producing province is British Columbia,' which
came into Confederation in 1871 and received ownership to its resources
at that time. This situation is in relative contrast to lands within the
American states, where there is substantial ownership of mineral inter-
ests by both the federal government and the private sector.*
Therefore, provincial control over oil and natural gas at the explora-
tion, development, and production stages has been easy and effective,
due to the two facts of public ownership and the constitutional power to
legislate with respect to the sale and management of public lands be-
longing to the province.' Hence, the Alberta petroleum and natural gas
lease (in law a bar license, there being no interest in land conveyed by
the so-called lease) provides that the lessee shall comply with provincial
legislation and, specifically, the Mines and Minerals Act10 and regula-
tions (which determine provincial Crown royalties). The lessee cove-
nants to use the oil and gas within the province unless the provincial
government consents otherwise. The Alberta Petroleum and Marketing
Act" provides that production must be sold through an entity of the
provincial government, the Alberta Petroleum Marketing Commission
(APMC), to an approved list of purchasers.
The province may dispose of publicly owned oil and gas as an inci-
dent of its ownership; and the province through its power of manage-
ment and sale, has sole jurisdiction at the first stage of activity, the allo-
cation of property rights. This includes the selection of the exploring
party, all the conditions of sale (such as the nature, extent, and duration
of such rights) and the consideration paid for such rights (i.e. the pro-
duction royalty payable to the province, bonus bids, and lease rentals).
To retain as much control as possible, the province wants to retain own-
ership so that the oil and gas interests remain publicly owned, and can
be regulated within s. 92(5) B.N.A. Act. The timing of the passage of
ownership will be important; for once ownership passes, the province
loses its main constitutional head of power over oil and gas (s. 92(5) of
the B.N.A. Act).
Alberta has drafted its lease to ensure that it is not a grant. The
lease has a determinable limitation. Non-compliance by a lessee with
provincial regulation after production would end the lease for failure to
comply with its conditions, and the remaining oil and gas still in those
7. With 10.6% of the country's natural gas production.
8. See generally, Thompson, Basic Contrasts Between Petroleum Land Policies of
Canada and the United States, 36 U. COLO. L. Rsv. 187 (1964).
9. See generally, Crommelin, "Government Management of Oil and Gas in Alberta."
(1975) 37 Alta. L. Rev. 146.
10. R.S.A. 1970, c.238 as am.
11. See, The Petroleum Marketing Act, S.A. 1973, c.96, as am.; The Mines and Miner-
als Amendment Act, S.A. 1973, c.94, as am.
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lands covered by the lease would continue to be owned by the province.
Therefore, a lessee must comply with the lease or its future rights are
ended, and the province thereby exercises control beyond the point of
production, at which ownership of its minerals passes.
As we have seen, provincial control at the first stage of activity, allo-
cation of rights, is complete, given provincial ownership coupled with s.
92(5) of the B.N.A. Act. Similarly, provincial control is exercised at the
second stage of activity, exploration. I emphasize again that the permit
or lease does not convey property rights (prior to production) so the
province can control both as owner and also because it has the power to
regulate exploration under s. 92(5).
At the third stage of activity, production, the province similarly ex-
ercises control. The pertinent Alberta legislation is its Oil and Gas Con-
servation Act,12 under which the Alberta Energy Resource Conservation
Board regulates production from the standpoint of conservation, as-
signing maximum rate limitations to oil wells and pools, and prohibiting
waste. It also regulates production from the marketing standpoint, ad-
ministering a system of market demand prorationing for oil and allocat-
ing this demand among oil producing pools and wells.
The provinces do have other constitutional powers that come into
play-s.s. 92(13) and 92(16) B.N.A. Act, which allow the provincial legis-
latures to legislate with respect to "Property and Civil Rights in the
Province" and "Generally All Matters of a Merely Local or Private Na-
ture in the Province." Thus, a province can legislate with respect to the
price of oil and gas consumed in that province. It should be noted as
well that the provinces have the power of direct taxation and thereby
impose an income tax on production profits by s. 92(2) B.N.A. Act.
However, the production royalty the province exacts as owner is the
main provincial fiscal instrument for oil and gas, with land sales and
bonus bids for production rights also an important source of revenue.
A particular constitutional problem has arisen in Saskatchewan
with respect to the attempts of the provincial government to design a
royalty to capture a high proportion of the resource value from produc-
tion. The scheme was struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada' s as
being unconstitutional, on the basis that it was an "indirect tax" and
violated the federal "trade and commerce" power. The provinces have
viewed this problem as being an unjustified infringement of provincial
12. P.S.A. 1970, c.267, as am.
13. Canadian Industrial Gas & Oil L.T.D. v. Province of Saskatchewan, (1977) 18
N.R. 107; [1977] 6 W.W.R. 607. Shortly thereafter, a provincial nationalization scheme for
the potash industry was struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada, for similar reasons.
Central Canada Potash Co. L.T.D. & Attorney General of Canada v. Government of Sas-




ownership of natural resources. The Constitution Act, 1981"s will pro-
vide expressly that a province can tax by any mode, directly or indi-
rectly, in respect of primary production. Thus, constitutional reform will
expand provincial jurisdiction to at least this extent. As for the impact
of constitutional reform upon "trade and commerce," it is somewhat
uncertain.
Until 1973, regulation of oil and gas was left almost entirely to the
provinces. Federal legislation was limited to the National Energy Board
Act,' 5 enacted under the federal trade and commerce power" dealing
with four areas: (1) performing an advisory function to the federal gov-
ernment (e.g., oil and gas supply demand forecasts); (2) approval of in-
terprovincial pipelines; (3) approval of traffic, tolls, and tariffs for such
pipelines; and (4) approval of the export from Canada of petroleum and
natural gas.
As well, Canada legislates" and administers with respect to federal
lands (called "Canada lands"), including the Northwest Territories,
Yukon Territory, and offshore continental margin. These areas were rel-
atively unimportant until the Prudhoe Bay discovery in February, 1968,
and the energy crisis beginning in 1973. There have been recent signifi-
cant oil discoveries in both the Beaufort Sea of the Arctic Ocean and
offshore Newfoundland. Parliament is presently considering Bill C-48,
the "Canada Oil and Gas Act," the intended new legislation for Canada
lands, which we shall return to shortly.
In summary, until 1973 the regulation of oil and gas with respect to
provincial lands was left virtually to the provinces with the exception of
those matters of national interest (interprovincial transportation and in-
ternational trade) covered by the National Energy Board Act.
So far as the federal parliament is concerned, its powers include the
regulation of trade and commerce, 8 general laws "for the Peace, Order
and Good Government of Canada" (POGG),'9 control of federal lands,
20
the competence to deal with interprovincial works and undertakings, 2'
and the power to declare by Act of Parliament works wholly situated
within a province to be for the general advantage of Canada.2 2 Thus,
Parliament has considerable constitutional powers to deal with the regu-
lation of petroleum and natural gas.
14. Part VII, s.56(1), which adds to The Constitution Act, 1867 s.92A.(4).
15. R.S.C. 1970, c.N-6, as am.
16. B.N.A. Act, supra, footnote 1, s.91(2).
17. Territorial Lands Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.T-6, as am., and the Oil and Gas Production
and Conservation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.0-4, as am.
18. B.N.A. Act, supra, footnote 1, s.91(2).
19. B.N.A. Act, 1871, 34-35 Vict., c.28 (U.K.).
20. B.N.A. Act, supra, footnote 1, s.91(1A).
21. Id., ss.91(29) and 92(10)(a).
22. Id., ss.91(29) and 92(10)(c).
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Until 1973 there was no controversy, and indeed, as illustrative of
the general satisfaction with respect to the divisions of constitutional
powers, the subject of natural resources was not even raised at the con-
ference on constitutional reform in Victoria in 1971."s
The fourth stage of activity is transportation, which involves a num-
ber of subjects. Intraprovincial pipelines (like Alberta Gas Trunk Line)
are regulated provincially, but at the point that a provincial system can
be said to be more than merely physically hooked up to extraprovincial
facilities, it would be part of an interprovincial "work and undertaking"
(such as the natural gas pipeline of Trans Canada Pipeline Company
and the oil pipeline of Interprovincial Pipeline Company) within federal
jurisdiction by s. 92(10)(a), s. 91(29), and also by virtue of the federal
trade and commerce power, s. 91(2). Note that s. 91(10)(c) also allows
Parliament to declare by legislation any "work in a province to be for
the general advantage of Canada," and thus bring such work under fed-
eral constitutional power (by s. 91(29)). Such power has not been used
in respect of oil and gas, but constitutionally (if not politically) could be
utilized with respect to all intraprovincial works-pipelines, feeder and
gathering lines, processing plants and refineries, and even christmas
trees and drilling rigs. However, as Alberta owns the natural resources
on publicly owned lands and has the constitutional power to manage
and sell such resources, the federal declaratory power could not be used,
in itself, to force production of petroleum and natural gas out of the
ground.
We now come to the fifth and critical stage of activity, marketing,
which involves two components, movement of the commodity and the
pricing thereof. As to movement, insofar as we are speaking of inter-
provincial and extra-territorial trade, such is clearly within the federal
sphere of constitutional power.24 Movement simply within a province
and the decision as to whether there will be exports from a province are
considered to be within provincial control."5
Now, let's consider pricing, which is at the heart of the revenue-
sharing dispute.
THE OIL-PRICING REVENUE-SHARING DisPuTE 1973-1981
Until the advent of the OPEC cartel in 1973, the wellhead price of
Alberta oil was generally set by provincial authority with reference to
the prices of alternative sources of supply in North America. The system
was a "netback" approach, the wellhead price being determined by the
23. The subject of natural resources was not mentioned in the Victoria Constitutional
Charter of 1971.
24. B.N.A. Act, supra, footnote 1, s.91(2).
25. For example, the export from Alberta of natural gas is controlled by The Gas
Resources Preservation Act, R.S.A. 1970, c.157, s.4(c), as am.
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deduction of transportation costs to the location of competitive
interface."6
By September 1973, Alberta producers were supplying at a wellhead
price of $3.8011 per barrel as far as the Chicago market, when the price
suddenly rose sharply due to the supply difficulties caused by the Mid-
dle East conflict and the OPEC cartel's pricing policy. The Trudeau
Government responded with a temporary price freeze on oil consumed
in Canada, coupled with an export tax2s on oil sold to the United States.
The export tax was set at the difference between Canadian and United
States' prices. The Alberta government opposed both the domestic price
freeze and the export tax. However, in January and April 1974 at fed-
eral-provincial First Ministers Conferences, an agreement was achieved
whereby the wellhead price of oil would rise by $2.70 per barrel (to $6.50
per barrel), and the federal government would retain the correspond-
ingly reduced export tax. This initial tranquility was relatively short-
lived due to the continuing instability in the international oil market
caused by the OPEC cartel.
The OPEC cartel is nothing more than a classic cartel of producers
who, through a near monopolistic control of supply coupled with a fairly
inelastic demand curve of consumers, have been able to force the price
of oil higher and have been able to gain considerably more in revenues
for their oil. Thus, in 1981, the price for a barrel of oil from Saudi Ara-
bia is some eighty times higher than the cost of production for that bar-
rel. Such an approach can be achieved in a non-competitive interna-
tional market. The monopolistic or windfall profits accruing to OPEC
are considerable. Leaving aside the question of what pressures might be
brought to bear upon OPEC, it is the impact of OPEC within Canada
that is to some considerable extent within the control of Canada and the
provinces. Both levels of government must be held accountable for poli-
cies devised to respond to the domestic ramifications of OPEC. My com-
ments shall focus upon Alberta at the provincial level because it ac-
counts for some 85% of the nation's production, and Alberta is the main
protagonist on behalf of the three western provinces in resource disputes
with the federal government.
1974-1978
In summary, the formation of the OPEC cartel had a two-fold effect
upon Canada. First, our security of supply was threatened, for the west-
26. Crommelin, "Government Management of Oil and Gas in Alberta," (1975) 13 Alta.
Law Rev. 146 at 168, 169.
27. All figures are given in Canadian dollars.
28. Oil Export Tax Act, S.C. 1974, c.53, made retroactive to October 1, 1973. Until the
legislation was in place, the National Energy Board, in effect, imposed and collected the
tax through its control of export permits.
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ern oil pipeline extended only to Ontario and the national gas pipeline
extended only as far as Montreal in Quebec. Therefore, Qu6bec and the
Maritimes were dependent upon the uncertainties of supply of offshore
OPEC oil.
Second, given that about 25% (425,000 bbl/day) of our total domes-
tic consumption is imported from OPEC countries, with escalating
world prices, there were significant domestic ramifications. The decision
was made by the Trudeau Government to have a uniform domestic price
for this basic commodity (subject only to transportation differentials)
and to maintain the domestic price below the world price with the do-
mestic price rising gradually. This necessitated price regulation with re-
spect to the April 1, 1974, price of $6.50 per barrel; the price was al-
lowed to rise only pursuant to federal-provincial agreement. By 1975 the
federal Petroleum Administration Act2" was enacted under the trade
and commerce power, retroactive to April 1, 1974.
It must be emphasized that the trade and commerce power in Ca-
nada has generally been considered by the courts as being limited to
interprovincial and international trade 0 and is not seen as extending to
the wellhead, as in the United States."1 In any event, the Petroleum Ad-
ministration Act expressly limits itself to interprovincial and interna-
tional trade in oil and gas. However, the regulated price for both oil and
natural gas (85% of the price of oil) was agreed to over the years by the
producing provinces and the federal government until July 1, 1980, so
that this legislation (Part II) imposed a regulated price based upon fed-
eral-provincial agreement until that point in time. Similarly, the price
for natural gas was agreed to by the producing provinces and the federal
government until September 1, 1980. The agreed-upon price was then
imposed upon the industry by Part III of the Petroleum Administration
Act.
As well, the export tax (retroactive to April 1, 1974) on oil was now
imposed by this Act (Part I) upon oil exported from the western prov-
inces to the United States, whereby the difference between the domestic
price and export price (determined by the National Energy Board on a
what-the-market-will-bear basis) was used to subsidize eastern refinery
importers who were importing at the world price and selling at the lower
domestic price. The subsidies were paid and administered by a board set
up under the Petroleum Administration Act (Part IV). In essence, Ca-
nada would use the tax dollars generated by selling western oil to the
United States at the world price and pay OPEC for imported oil at the
29. S.C. 1974-75-76, c.47 as am.
30. Reference re Farm Products Marketing Act, R.S.O. 1950, c.131, as am., [1957]
S.C.R. 198.
31. See, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin et al., 347 U.S. 672 (1954) upholding the
validity of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §717 et seq.
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world price, maintaining a lower, uniform domestic price.
The energy crisis quickly resulted in a dramatic change from the
previous perception of a country with a virtually unlimited supply of
both oil and natural gas to that of a country with rapidly dwindling sup-
plies of domestic conventional oil. Incidentally, if one wanted to identify
a single reason for a significant change in public attitude at that time
and since toward the industry-rightly or wrongly-it would be the
shocked realization that the data supplied by industry to the National
Energy Board, upon which the forecasts of virtually unlimited reserves
were made, was now somehow incorrect. The impression left was that,
when the industry wanted exports, supplies were seen as limitless; while
after OPEC the argument of industry (wanting a higher price and
profit) was that prices had to rise to finance the exploration and devel-
opment of new discoveries, as the country was in desperate short supply.
The federal government reacted to the new short supply perception
and argument by embarking upon a policy of gradually phasing-out oil
exports to the United States, introducing new tax incentives (for exam-
ple, the frontier exploration allowances2 ), and introducing measures for
greater Canadian equity and control (for example, the creation of Petro
Canada in 1976,s s '3 with preferential treatment for it-such as the
"back-in" for a 25% interest before discovery on Canada lands8 8 and
support of an acquisition program by Petro Canada).
As oil exports from Canada fell and the price for OPEC oil contin-
ued to rise rapidly, the federal government could no longer pay the
Arabs by taking from the Americans. An increasing deficit was resulting
from the net drain on the federal treasury due to subsidizing eastern
importers. The only way to reduce this subsidy was to allow the feder-
ally regulated uniform domestic price to rise. As it rose, there was then
an intense struggle between the provinces and federal government over
the "windfall profit" revenue from domestic production.
Alberta moved very quickly in 1973, amending its royalty regula-
tions under s. 132 of the Mines and Minerals Act, so that it could cap-
ture the lion's share of the rising wellhead price. The federal govern-
ment counter-attacked by making provincial royalties nondeductible for
income tax purposes.8 " The industry was caught in the middle between
32. This tax provision, (Regs. 1207 of the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c.63),
operated such as to result in an after-tax cost of about seven cents on the dollar for the
bulk of exploration expenditures in offshore activities.
32.1 The Petro Canada Act, S.C. 1974-75, c.61.
33. See generally, Energy, Mines and Resources, Statement of Policy on the Proposed
Petroleum and Natural Gas Act (May 19, 1976). Bill C-48, Canada Oil and Gas Act repeals
sections 120 and 121 of Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations made pursuant to Public
Lands Grants Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.P-29 and to Territorial Lands Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.T-6, as
am.
34. The Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c.63, s.18(1)(m), as am. by S.C. 1974-75-76,
19821
Canadian-American Law Journal
the two governments. To some extent the industry was worse off than it
was before the wellhead price rose in 1974 (at least in Saskatchewan,
where the province levied a royalty equal to 100% of the price increase,
but such royalty was not deductible in calculating federal income taxes).
By 1976 both levels of government backed-off somewhat and rela-
tive stability retrned to the overall fiscal system. The federal govern-
ment introduced in its June 23, 1975 budget a resource allowance for
income tax purposes equal to 25% of resource production profits, effec-
tive January 1, 1976.81 This provided a partial offset to the full disallow-
ance of provincial Crown royalty payments. Alberta also introduced par-
tial rebates for provincial income taxes 6 and modified its royalty take.
By the beginning of 1976, relative calm had descended upon the domes-
tic revenue-sharing dispute.
The new norm for revenue-sharing was for the provinces to receive
about 45% of the revenues represented by the wellhead price. The his-
torical royalty percentage to Alberta was 162/3 % and was only about
23% in 1973. Thus, as shown in Table 1, the provinces were able to
establish the new norm for revenue-sharing at about double their 1973
share. This percentage share was being determined upon a wellhead
price that would rise from $3.80/barrel in 1973 to $16.75/barrel at the
time of the announcement of the Trudeau Government's National En-
ergy Program, October 28, 1980. Provincial revenues expanded ten times
in quantitative terms from 1972 to 1979.11
At the same time, the national government was left with less than
10% of the gross revenues (its traditional percentage) and having to pay
an increasing subsidy, amounting to about $3.5 billion annually by 1980
for offshore imports due to the widening gap between the domestic price
and the world price for oil.
Given the new norm for revenue-sharing as between the producing
provinces and the federal government from 1974 to 1980, there was a
significant domestic impact upon the fiscal structure of the country. Due
to rising prices, there was a tremendous transfer of wealth by the con-
suming provinces (in particular Ontario, having about 36% of the coun-
try's population) and a lower standard of living plus greater unemploy-
ment in all provinces east of Saskatchewan. For the first time since
World War II, there was an accelerating regional disparity, caused by
the revenue-sharing structure.
Finally, the revenue-sharing phenomenon had a profound impact
upon "equalization" payments from 1974 onwards. The equalization
c.26, s.7.
35. The Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c.63, s.20(1)(v.1) & 20(15), as am. by S.C.
1974-75-76, c.71, s.1(1) & (2).
36. The Alberta Income Tax Amendment Act, S.A. 1976, c.27, s.2.
37. From about $ .5 billion to about $5 billion. See, National Energy Program, p.13.
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scheme, first established in 1957, is implemented through a Federal-Pro-
vincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing Act' s
every five years, based upon federal-provincial agreement. The Act has
as its policy objective the reduction of regional disparity accomplished
by minimum levels of public services being provided through the trans-
fer of "equalization" dollars from the federal treasury to have-not prov-
inces, thus reducing the incidence of provincial taxes that otherwise
would be necessary in such provinces in order to provide basic services.
Specifically, equalization payments were designed to ensure that no
province has access to less than the all-province average of per-capita
revenues. It should be noted that the federal government raises its reve-
nues for all purposes, including equalization, mainly from its corporate
and individual income tax bases. Ontario residents paid some $30 billion
more in income taxes to the federal government from 1957 to 1980 as a
consequence of the equalization scheme.
The equalization formula focuses upon provincial revenues, with
revenues being equalized over some 29 revenue sources (e.g., personal
and corporate tax income sources) including royalty and other revenues
from natural resource development. Equalization payments are a very
significant source of revenue to six "have-not" provinces, with each of
the four Atlantic provincial governments receiving more than 25% of
total provincial revenues from this source. Only two provinces, British
Columbia and Alberta, have negative equalization entitlements under
the formula. Saskatchewan is in the position of just about having a nil
balance.
The equalization scheme, due to rising resource revenues to the pro-
ducing provinces, results in equalization entitlements being triggered
from the federal treasury (not the treasuries of the producing provinces)
to the remaining provinces. Because the financial impact was so adverse
upon the federal treasury, the federal government unilaterally amended
the equalization formula in 1974 s9 (altering the original concept of "full
equalization"). This was followed by further amendments in 197740 and
1981,"' whereby only one-half of all energy revenues are taken into con-
sideration for equalization purposes and any province (being Ontario)
38. The Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing
Act, 1977, S.C. c.10, as am. See generally, Thomas J. Courchene, "Energy and Equaliza-
tion," August, 1979, a paper prepared for the Ontario Economic Council's Energy Confer-
ence, September 27-28, 1979.
39. The formula was modified in 1974 to provide that resource revenues up to the
1973/74 levels would continue to be eligible for full equalization while thereafter only one
dollar out of every three would be eligible to enter the formula.
40. After 1977, only one-half of all provincial resource revenues would be eligible for
equalization.
41. This amendment built in the limitation as to per capita income. See S.C. 1981,
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where per capita income is above the national average in the current
year, as well as for the two previous years, is, as of such current year,
ineligible to receive an equalization payment, even though its overall
equalization entitlements become positive.
Thus, the revenue-sharing from oil and gas revenues made the
equalization system unworkable. The formula went through a series of
amending adjustments, all of which depart from the original concept of
"full equalization" and the policy objective of reducing regional dispar-
ity and fostering regional growth.
As well, given that the federal treasury funds equalization payments
to the have-not provinces and that the federal treasury raises its reve-
nues in the main from its income tax base, the impact of higher oil and
gas prices has meant higher income taxes. As the residents of Ontario
constitute about 40% of the federal income tax base, higher oil and gas
prices have had a two-fold impact upon Ontario residents. Ontario con-
sumers pay higher prices and also pay higher income taxes toward
equalization. And while the governments of Manitoba, Quebec, and the
Atlantic provinces have supported the producing provinces in their
quest for higher oil and gas prices (in part because Manitoba, Qu6bec,
and the Atlantic provinces thereby gain some equalization entitlement),
there is, of course, a higher private cost to their residents through in-
creased prices and income taxes.
At this point it is appropriate to keep in mind certain national poli-
cies since World War II which in my view are illustrative of national
values and norms.
HISTORICAL NATIONAL POLICIES
There are at least four basic federal policies since World War II to
keep in mind, before considering the present energy dispute further.
First, the federal government in 1961 devised a National Oil Policy"
which provided a captive domestic market west of Qu6bec43 for western
oil, the price of which was about 15% higher than for offshore oil until
1973.
Second, the federal fiscal system has always provided significant
subsidies through tax expenditures for the oil and gas industry. Thus,
automatic depletion (replaced in 1974 by earned depletion), the frontier
exploration allowance from 1976 to 1980, supplementary depletion al-
lowance since 1978 with respect to heavy oil projects and tertiary recov-
ery, coupled with fast write-offs for exploration expenses (100% in the
current year), development expenses (30%), and investment tax credits
42. This policy was adopted following the Second Report of the Royal Commission on
Energy (July, 1959).
43. The precise geographical division point is the Ottawa River valley.
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have all resulted in significant subsidies through the federal tax system.
Third, pipeline subsidies and financial guarantees were provided by
the federal government with respect to the great inter-provincial pipe-
line projects.
All three of the aforementioned federal policies were promulgated
for the purpose of facilitating growth and development of the petroleum
and gas industry in western Canada with consequential regional growth
and corresponding reduction in regional disparity, all of which was seen
as being in the national interest.
A fourth example of this basic federal policy objective of reducing
regional disparity was the introduction of "equalization" payments from
1957 forward, as already discussed. Of interest is that Alberta received
equalization payments until 1967.
All of the above national policies are illustrative of the continuing
objective of Parliament to reduce regional disparities, foster regional
growth, and effect a redistribution of national income. However, as we
have seen, the revenue-sharing structure for resource revenues that was
put into place for 1974 to 1980 ran counter to these historical national
objectives. Let us now return to the pricing/revenue-sharing dispute.
1978-1980
With the Iranian revolution in January, 1979, and OPEC's conse-
quentially increased control over a reduced supply, the world price again
quickly escalated from about $18.00/bbl. to $32.00/bbl. A second energy
crisis fell upon Canada revitalizing all of the 1974-1975 problems. In
particular, the federal government was faced with a rising deficit due to
subsidies for eastern imports of oil.
The Conservative Government under Prime Minister Joe Clark was
elected on May 22, 1979, and introduced an energy budget on December
18, 1979. On the price side, the Clark budget would have increased the
domestic price for oil, within four years, to 85% of the world price or
the Chicago price, whichever was less. This approach would have had
the positive benefit of reducing the import subsidy deficit significantly,
achieving greater conservation as oil users were forced to pay higher
prices, and would have increased the cash flow to industry which would
have improved the finding and development of domestic supplies, lead-
ing the nation closer to domestic self-sufficiency.
However, on the revenue-sharing side, the Clark budget would have
compounded the existing problems, for that budget would have main-
tained the producing provinces' share at 45%, doubling the federal gov-
ernment's share from 10% to 20% by reducing industry's share to 35%.
Moreover, since this approach left the Clark Government with a
shortfall of needed monies for other programs, the budget proposed an
$.18/gallon excise tax upon the consumer at the gasoline pump. The
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budget, with a very sound approach on pricing, was a disaster on the
revenue-sharing side and would have only hastened the rate of growing
regional disparity within Canada. The budget was consistent with the
Clark Government's limited view that Canada is simply a community of
communities. The Clark Minority Goverment was defeated in a vote in
the House of Commons on its budget. Another Trudeau Government
was elected on February 18, 1980, followed by its energy budget and
National Energy Program4 of October 28, 1980.
As a main plank in its election platform, the Liberal Party had
stated that it would keep the prices of petroleum and natural gas lower
than the Tories' budget would have provided. This had great appeal in
Ontario, and it was the Ontario electorate which swung from the Con-
servatives in 1979 to the Liberals in 1980 causing the change in
government.
The newly elected Trudeau Government, faced with continuing en-
ergy problems, made an election pledge to keep prices down, and a furi-
ous Alberta government (which had just missed getting through in the
Clark budget the pricing/revenue-sharing package it wanted) then em-
barked upon the formulation of a National Energy Program. It would be
apparent to the astute observer that a key element in that program
would necessarily be to keep the wellhead price from rising rapidly, thus
in effect tending to limit Alberta's and the industry's revenue shares and
imposing new federal taxes subsequent to the point at the wellhead,
thereby raising both federal revenues and the eventual price to consum-
ers and, at the same time, reducing the subsidy for offshore imports by
narrowing the gap between the domestic price to consumers and the
world price. The point is: the regulation of pricing was to be a main
instrument in effecting revenue-sharing.
The then existing federal-provincial agreement on domestic pricing
for oil expired on July 1, 1980, due to the impossibility of federal-Al-
berta agreement on revenue-sharing.
As of the announcement of the National Energy Program (October
28, 1980), the federal government unilaterally continued its wellhead
price for oil by regulation under Part II of the Petroleum Administra-
tion Act.44" Alberta was allowed to raise its wellhead price by $2.00 per
barrel, to $16.75, as of August, 1980; but the stage was set for unilateral
federal action.
44. Published under the authority of The Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources
Canada, Report EP80-4E.
44.1 Division II of Part II of the Petroleum Administration Act was proclaimed into
force on October 28, 1980, S.I. 80-182, in The Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 114, No. 21,
3473. Similarly, the federal government unilaterally regulated the price for natural gas by
proclaiming into force on November 1, 1980, s.52(1) of the Petroleum Administration Act,
S.I. 80-183, The Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 114, No. 21, 3475.
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THE NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM
The National Energy Program (NEP) was announced on October
28, 1980, together with the Trudeau Government's budget. Its three pol-
icy objectives are (1) security of supply, (2) the Canadianization of the
industry, and (3) a fair pricing/revenue-sharing regime.
The first objective, security of supply, is not controversial. The ap-
proach is an "off-oil policy"-reducing oil consumption by facilitating
the substitution of natural gas which is in abundant supply. Just as the
oil pipeline from western Canada was extended in 1975 to Montreal to
give greater security to Quebec (which was vulnerable to a curtailment
of OPEC supplies), the natural gas pipeline from western Canada is be-
ing extended from Montreal to Quebec City and under the NEP is to be
extended further to the Maritimes. By providing pipeline subsidies and
a natural gas price of 65% relative to oil, the federal government hopes
to achieve the virtual elimination of oil imports by 1990.
The second NEP objective, Canadianization of the industry, is to be
met by such means as Petro Canada acquisitions and a federal grants
system (the Petroleum Incentives Program, or PIP as it is called) in
support of exploration and development activities, which discriminates
in favor of persons depending upon their "Canadian Ownership Rate"
(COR). Undoubtedly, there are many arguments for and against the
Canadianization objective and the various means employed. However,
one point must be kept in mind in the context of the central theme of
this paper: the federal/provincial struggle over pricing/revenue-sharing.
Given that about 72% of the petroleum and natural gas industry was
foreign-owned at the time of the NEP, not only is there a significant
windfall element to owners of conventional oil and natural gas due to a
rising domestic price, but also, given the degree of foreign ownership,
there are significant ramifications in terms of the potential outflow of
funds from the country, balance of payments, and the value of the dol-
lar. Given these factors, it makes very good sense for the federal govern-
ment to do what is possible to achieve a much higher degree of Cana-
dian equity ownership in the petroleum and natural gas industry.
Let's now consider the intended impact of the NEP upon the fed-
eral-provincial pricing/revenue-sharing dispute; that is, the third objec-
tive of the NEP, fairness in the pricing/revenue-sharing regime. The
NEP proposed to maintain the now unilaterally federally regulated well-
head price under the Petroleum Administration Act, with only gradually
staged increases for conventional oil45 and a somewhat higher price
schedule for non-conventional (oil sands and tertiary recovery) oil."6
This approach would implicitly restrict the growth in the producing




provinces' share and producer netbacks, both dependent upon the price
at the wellhead. Clearly, the Petroleum Administration Act is constitu-
tionally valid, being premised upon the trade and commerce power
under s. 91(2) of the B.N.A. Act.
Alberta's reaction to this approach was to announce a cut-back in
oil production of 180,000 bls/day, phased-in in three stages each of
60,000 bls/day, to be completed on September 1, 1981. This approach
meant an increase in costly imports and more federal subsidies for such
imports. Alberta, as owner, and with the constitutional power to manage
the sale of its resources under s. 92(5) of the B.N.A. Act similarly had
the clear power to take this action. Although the federal government
could constitutionally employ its declaratory power to seize the works of
the industry in Alberta,47 it could not force production. The federal gov-
ernment could probably use its "Peace Order and Good Government"
(POGG) power to expropriate provincially owned natural resources for
an emergency period. However, Premier Lougheed of Alberta was care-
ful to state, when he announced the intended cut-back in production,
that Alberta would re-establish such production in an emergency
situation.
The NEP also introduced several excise type taxes subsequent to
the point of production at the wellhead. The first was the Petroleum
Compensation Charge (PCC) imposed upon the refinery. The PCC
would have risen from $2.55/bbl in December, 1980, to $10.05/bbl by
1983, and at that point in time would equal nearly 45% of the wellhead
price of $22.75/bbl. 4' The wellhead price together With the PCC consti-
tute what is called the "blended price."
The purpose of the PCC is to shift the burden of paying the subsidy
for imported oil from the federal treasury directly to consumers. The
total cost of the subsidy for 1981-82 will be about $4.6 billion. By in-
creasing the blended price through increasing the PCC to consumers,
there is a corresponding reduction in the amount necessary to be raised
by federal subsidies for imported oil.
As well, the NEP would have levied an excise tax on all natural gas
and natural gas liquids sales at the point of distribution4 9 and an 8%
petroleum and gas revenue tax (PGRT)' ° upon the producer. Both of
these taxes proposed by the NEP have been modified in the subsequent
agreement of September 1, 1981, between Alberta and the federal gov-
ernment. I will discuss the taxes further in that context.
Finally, through the Canadian Ownership Charge (COC),5 ' an excise
47. B.N.A. Act, supra, footnote 1, ss.91(29) and 92(10)(c).
48. The NEP, supra, footnote 44, p. 30.
49. Id., p. 35.
50. Id., p. 37.
51. Id., p. 51.
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tax at the point of consumption, consumers are paying for Petro Ca-
nada's acquisitions, the first of which, since the NEP, has been the $1.45
billion purchase of Petrofina Canada. This has resulted in a Canadian
ownership charge of $1.15/bbl and $.15/mcf.
In my opinion, all of the above-mentioned taxes proposed by the
NEP are within the federal government's constitutional powers of taxa-.
tion " and trade and commerce.5
However, the Alberta government challenged the bill5 4 introduced
in Parliament to enact the excise tax on natural gas and gas liquids by
way of a reference case to the Alberta Court of Appeal. The test case
deals with a natural gas well on provincially owned lands drilled and
operated by the province itself. Thus, it was not disputed that the natu-
ral gas in question was the property of the Province of Alberta.
Alberta asserted that Parliament could not impose a tax levy be-
cause of B.N.A. Act s. 125 which provides that "no lands or property
belonging to Canada or any Province shall be liable to taxation." This
provision has been interpreted in the past so as not to restrict the val-
idly exercised federal taxation and trade and commerce powers." If the
federal legislation imposing the tax is classified as being in relation to a
matter within ss. 91(2) or 91(3) B.N.A. Act, it would be valid notwith-
standing its simply incidental impact upon provincial lands or property.
However, the provincial Court of Appeal 6 held that simply because the
natural gas and gas liquids levy was in the nature of a tax, it was consti-
tutionally invalid in respect of the factual situation referred to the
Court. If this decision were to stand and was followed literally, it might
mean that a province could expropriate its producing industry or struc-
ture a regime whereby the provincial Crown is made the producer in law
with respect to provincial oil and gas production, thereby immunizing
such production from federal taxes. However, this decision has little sig-
nificance, given the Agreement of September 1, 1981, between Alberta
and the federal government, which resolves the dispute.
Thus, the period from October 28, 1980, to September 1, 1981, saw
an intense confrontation between the federal government and the pro-
ducing provinces, with Alberta challenging the constitutionality of the
federal excise tax on natural gas, cutting-back on domestic oil produc-
tion by 10%, refusing to issue permits to allow major tar sands projects
(Alsands and Cold Lake) to proceed, and British Columbia simply refus-
52. B.N.A. Act, supra, footnote 1, s.91(3).
53. Id., s.91(2).
54. Bill C-57, s.43, proposed to amend the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.E-13.
55. (Liquor Import Case) [1924] A.C. 22 (P.C.). See generally, Crommelin, "Jurisdic-
tion over Onshore Oil and Gas in Canada," (1975), 10 U.B.C. L. Rev. 86.
56. Reference Re Questions Set Out in O.C. 1079/80 Concerning Tax Proposed by
Parliament of Canada on Exported Natural Gas, [1981] 3 W.W.R. 408.
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ing to pay the federal excise tax on natural gas. At the heart of the
disputes was, of course, the continuing pricing/revenue-sharing question.
However, a settlement of the dispute was achieved between Alberta and
the federal government on September 1, 1981. Since that time, settle-
ments substantively similar have been achieved between each of British
Columbia' " and Saskatchewan 6 2 and the federal government.
THE SEPTEMBER 1, 1981 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT RELATING TO
ENERGY PRICING AND TAXATION BETWEEN ALBERTA AND CANADA
The Energy Pricing and Taxation Agreement of September 1, 1981
(hereinafter the Agreement), sets forth the compromise arrived at be-
tween Alberta and the federal government with respect to pricing and
revenue-sharing for petroleum and natural gas. The Agreement is to
cover the period September 1, 1981, to December 31, 1986.
The Agreement provides for substantially higher producer prices at
the wellhead than those proposed by the NEP. By July 1, 1986, old oil"7
will have a price of $57.75/bbl,58 and new oil of $77.48/bbl," whereas
under the NEP old oil would have been priced at $38.75/bb."
The NEP had introduced the Petroleum Compensation Charge
(PCC) as an excise tax at the refinery. The generated revenue was to
compensate the federal treasury for subsidies paid to refineries for the
higher cost of oil sands production and imported oil. The PCC is to be
extended under the Agreement to cover the higher cost to refineries of
new oil, as well as the higher cost for imported oil.61 The wellhead price
for old oil plus the PCC is to be the "blended price."
The Agreement provides 2 that natural gas destined for domestic
markets east of Alberta will be priced at the Alberta border, with such
price to increase by $.25 per Mcf every six months, commencing Febru-
ary 1, 1982.
The Government of Canada will continue to levy the NEP-an-
56.1. The British Columbia Energy Pricing and Taxation Agreement was signed on
September 24, 1981.
56.2. The Saskatchewan Energy Pricing and Taxation Agreement was signed on Octo-
ber 27, 1981.
57. "Old" oil means oil recovered from a pool initially discovered prior to January 1,
1981.
58. However, there is a built-in constraint that the price for "old oil" will not exceed
75% of the world price for oil. However, new oil has a ceiling of 100% of the world price
for oil.
59. Memorandum of Agreement between The Government of Canada and The Gov-
ernment of Alberta relating to Energy Pricing and Taxation, September 1, 1981, Table 1,
p. 2; Table 2, p. 4.
60. Supra, footnote 45.
61. The Agreement, supra, footnote 59, p. 8.
62. Id., p. 7.
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nounced excise tax on natural gas and gas liquids (NGGLT) produced in
Canada but will fix the rate at zero on exports of natural gas from Ca-
nada. 3 Thus, the federal government has agreed to forego taxing ex-
ported natural gas, to which tax Alberta and British Columbia took
strenuous objection.
On domestically sold natural gas, the wholesale price for natural gas
at the Toronto City Gate is to be approximately 65% of the average
price of crude oil at the Toronto Refinery Gate.64 This differential is to
encourage conversion from oil to natural gas usage and is part of the
"off-oil" policy of the federal government.
To assist in the expansion of the natural gas pipeline east of Mon-
treal, Alberta will pay to the federal government 30% of the Alberta
border price times the annual volume of new sales of gas east of Al-
berta.65 The federal government will use such monies to subsidize pipe-
line expansion through to the Maritimes.
The 8% Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT), another quasi-
excise tax" announced by the NEP and effective January, 1981, on Ca-
nadian net production revenues and royalty incomes (other than the
royalties received by governments), has been increased to 16% under
the Agreement, effective January 1, 1982.67 However, there is to be a
new resource allowance deduction of 25% of all oil and gas production
revenues for producers paying provincial royalties."s The Petroleum and
Gas Revenue Tax is viewed by the Government of Canada as generating
the funds necessary to finance the Petroleum Incentive Program pay-
ments, plus providing a net surplus approximately equal to 75% of fed-
eral corporate income taxes from the oil and gas industry.6 9
The Agreement also provides that the federal government will im-
pose a new tax, the Incremental Oil Revenue Tax (IORT), effective Jan-
uary 1, 1982.70 This tax, at a rate of 50%, will be upon incremental old
oil revenues after deduction for the related royalty payable to the
province.
As the Agreement is in very general terms, it is very difficult to cal-
culate the critical factor of "netback" to producers resulting from the
Agreement. A good many assumptions must be made in interpreting the
63. Id., p. 9.
64. Id.
65. Id., Schedule C., p. 514, 515.
66. Only operating expenses are deductible under the NEP. Net production revenues
are computed before deduction of Crown royalties and like charges, depletion, deprecia-
tion, exploration, and development expenses, interest and other financial expenses, and
research expenses.
67. The Agreement, supra, footnote 59, p. 10.
68. Id., p. 10; Schedule D, p. 517.
69. Id., Table 3, p. 22.
70. Id., p. 10.
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Agreement, and it will be for the federal and provincial governments in
the coming months to provide a definitive interpretation to the Agree-
ment and make adjustments. The federal government is expected to in-
troduce in Parliament by the end of 1981 a bill respecting a proposed
Energy Security Act, 1981 which will put in place at the federal level the
necessary legislation to implement the Agreement.
70.1
Certainly, with respect to new oil, which will include frontier oil, the
movement to world pricing should yield a substantial increase in
"netback," with a corresponding stimulation toward renewed growth in
oil industry activity in the western provinces and the frontier regions.
However, the "netback" for old and new natural gas and old oil may be
slightly less than under the NEP, as the preliminary interpretations of
some analysts suggest.71 If this is the situation, it may not accurately
augur the attraction of exploratory activity when at present a producer
in the United States can obtain more than twice as much as in Canada
for an mcf of natural gas. As well, companies in the United States can
cash in on their finds immediately. However, the Agreement itself as-
serts that the revenues to industry under the Agreement will be some
$10 billion more than under the NEP .
7
The Agreement provides for significant increases in price for domes-
tic petroleum and natural gas, bringing Canadian prices to near world
prices over the next five years. This approach will have the positive ben-
efit of removing the deficit to the federal treasury due to subsidies for
imported oil. It will also tend to achieve conservation and will provide a
cash flow both to facilitate the "off-oil" policy and, hopefully, to provide
greater incentives for industry to explore and develop new sources of
supply.
However, on the revenue-sharing side, it is apparent that the Agree-
ment takes the lion's share of revenues for the public sector and, more
significantly, leaves to Alberta the bulk of those revenues flowing to gov-
ernment. Of the total estimated gross revenues of $212.8 billion 7 from
oil and gas production over the period, 25.5% will be received by Ca-
nada, 30.2% is to go to Alberta, and 44.3% will be received by the in-
dustry. As I have said, first impressions indicate that there is considera-
ble skepticism as to the true "netback" to producers. However, it is
apparent that Alberta (and the other producing provinces of Saskatche-
wan and British Columbia through their similar agreements) is the
victor in the federal-provincial struggle of the past eight years over re-
source revenues. As Table 1 to this paper indicates, although the per-
70.1 Energy Security Act (not yet introduced).
71. See, for example, "Energy Pricing and Taxation Agreement," Clarkson Gordon
news release of September 11, 1981.




centage share of the provinces has dropped to about 30%, the wellhead
price for conventional "old" oil will have increased approximately 20
times from 1973. Whatever the precise figures, the point is that the pro-
vincial government representing about 9% of the country's population
will be receiving revenues in such immense quantities that regional dis-
parity will grow. Consuming provinces will suffer a corresponding nega-
tive impact of inflation and unemployment as the transfer of wealth
takes place to Alberta with the federal government having relatively few
energy dollars to recycle to those provinces and otherwise manage the
economy. This phenomenon is in marked contrast to other energy-rich
countries, including federal states like Australia or unitary states such as
Norway and the United Kingdom, where the national government cap-
tures most of the revenues accruing from resource development.7 ' As
well, federal revenues (in contrast to provincial revenues) through the
taxes imposed pursuant to the Agreement, will diminish if the world
price for oil flattens or is reduced, as seems likely given the present glut
of supply and reduced demand for OPEC oil.
Moreover, given the lack of monies generally on the part of the fed-
eral government in Canada with which to carry out its programs and
effectuate a redistribution of wealth, its posture at present is to endeav-
our to reduce federal funding for shared cost programs with the prov-
inces. The overall consequence of the revenue-sharing settlement, ac-
complished by the September 1, 1981 Agreement, insofar as government
revenues are concerned, is for the producing provinces to get wealthier
at the expense of the seven eastern provinces, all of which must suffer a
diminution in their level of public services and standard of living. If the
federal govenment had raised the domestic price for oil and gas to near
world levels, as the Agreement does and which approach makes great
sense, but had insisted upon reducing the producing provinces to their
historical pre-OPEC percentage share of revenues, the producing prov-
inces would have continued to have the dynamic economies they pres-
ently have and also would have continued to be by far the wealthiest
region of the country; but the federal government would have had the
dollars necessary to redistribute to the "have-not" provinces so that
they could have regional growth as well. Thus, the Agreement of Sep-
tember 1, 1981, while welcomed generally because it brings an apparent
end to seemingly endless, destructive federal-provincial conflict, builds
into confederation a policy and financial impact that runs counter to
historical policies and values of reducing regional disparity and fostering
regional growth.
74. The NEP, supra, footnote 44, p. 14.
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CONTINUING AND FUTURE ISSUES AND CONFLICTS
It is doubtful that any confederation can have generally happy and
satisfied citizens in the long term if it contains both Kuwaits and Ban-
gladeshes within its borders. The next great issue in Canadian public
policy, now that the energy dispute is seemingly put to rest and consti-
tutional reform will shortly be completed, will be a revamping of the
equalization scheme as the present Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrange-
ments and Established Programs Financing Act,75 expires March 31,
1982. As we have seen, its structure, objectives, and values have already
been compromised due to the resources revenue-sharing dispute. The
Premiers of the producing provinces have already stated that the federal
government should not look to their resource dollars to provide the
monies for equalization. In the meanwhile, the federal government has
said that it must reduce generally its transfer payments to the prov-
inces. Federal-provincial negotiations on equalization and shared-cost
programs should prove interesting. The battles undoubtedly will equal
those over resources revenue-sharing and constitutional reform.
Before concluding, it should be mentioned that there is a remaining
dispute: that of resource revenue-sharing from the continental margin.
There have been significant discoveries to date on Canada's continental
margin in the Beaufort Sea and offshore Newfoundland (Hibernia).
The existing federal legislation 7 as well as Bill C-48, the proposed
Canada Oil and Gas Act, expressly embrace the entire continental mar-
gin as federal lands. The same position has been asserted in other fed-
eral states, such as the United States 77 and Australia.7 8 In my opinion,
all of the continental margin adjacent to Canada is in law federal
lands, 9 so that federal legislation, which provides the entire regulatory
regime for the exploration and development of oil and natural gas on
federal lands ("Canada lands") is valid legislation. As federally owned
lands, Parliament has the exclusive constitutional authority to legislate
in respect of such lands by B.N.A. Act s. 91(1A).
Given federal ownership to the continental margin, the fact that the
federal treasury has financed about 90% of all offshore exploratory ac-
75. R.S.C. 1970, c.F-6.
76. See, Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C. 1964, c.22, s.3, as am.
77. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1331(a) (1970); Submerged Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. §1301 (1970); United States v. Texas; 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v.
Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
78. See, New South Wales v. Australia, [1976] 8 A.L.R. 1 (Austrailian Law Reports).
79. See, Reference Re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights [19681, 65 D.L.R. (2d)
353 (S.C.C.). Although this decision, in favor of the federal government, dealt only with
the continental margin adjacent to British Columbia, the reasons are applicable to the
entire continental margin, unless another province can establish an exceptional history.
Section 2 of Bill C-48, the proposed Canada Oil and Gas Act, in defining "Canada lands"
asserts federal ownership and jurisdiction to the full extent of the continental margin.
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tivity through tax expenditures via subsidies through the federal income
tax regime and the importance of the continental margin to the national
interest, one might expect that the federal government would want to
retain ownership of the continental margin and constitutional jurisdic-
tion over it.
Moreover, given the historical policies of redistribution of wealth
through equalization and other federal transfer payments, it should be
remembered that Newfoundland has derived almost 30% of annual pro-
vincial government revenues from the federal government since its con-
federation with Canada in 1949. I have calculated these federal transfers
to be a total of almost $7 billion.
The discoveries off the east coast of Canada may be enormous, per-
haps rivaling those of the North Sea and the coastal provinces, particu-
larly in Newfoundland, which should be able to influence the pace and
nature of that development and benefit substantially from it. No Cana-
dian would want otherwise. However, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia
both assert sovereignty to their adjacent continental margin and, indeed,
have introduced regulatory regimes for their respective areas ° on the
incorrect premise that they have the constitutional right to do so.
Newfoundland became a province in 1949 and came into Confedera-
tion with whatever lands it had sovereignty to at the time. The question
as to whether this included its adjacent continental margin turns upon
whether customary international law had developed by that point in
time such as to provide that a state had sovereignty to its adjacent con-
tinental margin. Although it is clear that such doctrine had developed
by at least 1958,1 it is very doubtful that such was the law in 1949. My
own view is that in law the entirety of Canada's continental margin ac-
cedes to Canada as the adjacent coastal sovereign state. The issue as to
Newfoundland's rights over its adjacent continental margin may proceed
to a court case, if there is not a federal-provincial political resolution of
the dispute as to revenue-sharing from the continental margin in the
near future.
The Conservative Government of Joe Clark had entered into a ten-
tative agreement on September 14, 1979, which stated the intent of his
government to transfer ownership of the continental margin adjacent to
80. Newfoundland published draft regulations for its offshore area in June, 1977.
These have since been enacted, Newfoundland and Labrador Petroleum Regulations, 1977,
Regulation 139/78. See generally, Energy Analects, vol. 6, no. 24, June, 1977. Petroleum
Resources Act, S.N.S.Cons.S. 1980, c.12 (not proclaimed).
81. Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471.; Law of the Sea: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606. In particular, articles 1, 2, and 3 of the first-mentioned Convention
acknowledge that a coastal state has exclusive rights with respect to the national resources
in its adjacent continental shelf. See also, Reference Re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral
Rights, (1968), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 353 (S.C.C.).
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Newfoundland to the province, so that the province would be owner and
the full range of provincial constitutional powers applicable to provincial
lands would apply, including s. 92(5) B.N.A. Act. This approach, again
consistent with the limited vision that Canada should be no more than a
community of communities, would have placed Newfoundland in the po-
sition, with respect to its offshore, that Alberta is in at present with
respect to its lands. Newfoundland has less than 600,000 people, being
only 21/2 % of the nation's population. The percentage share accuring to
a producing province from oil and natural gas production since 1973 (as
seen in Table 1 to this paper), if applied to Newfoundland, could easily
turn that province from its present situation as the poorest province
into being be far the wealthiest province within the next generation.
Newfoundland could easily be the Alberta of the year 2000. The dispar-
ity in wealth between Newfoundland and nearby Prince Edward Island
could be in the order of ten times the magnitude. The Clark approach
would have fostered regional dispartiy inconsistent with the very na-
tional policies which have fostered regional growth in the Atlantic
provinces.
The Clark Government was, of course, defeated in the February 18,
1980, general election. To this point in time, the position of the Trudeau
Government has been that the federal government should retain owner-
ship and constitutional jurisdiction to the continental margin, yet allow
Newfoundland to receive revenues in the nature of those received by a
province, until Newfoundland achieves the national average in terms of
wealth, and to allow Newfoundland to share in the management deci-
sions for development. Negotiations between the federal government
and Newfoundland will commence shortly, and it must be hoped that
the federal government will remain firm in retaining ownership and con-
stitutional jurisdiction to the continental margin. Moreover, the prece-
dent established with Newfoundland, and through any subsequent
agreements with other coastal provinces, will undoubtedly influence the
question of the eventual constitutional development of the two federal
territories, the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories, which
have a present a total of only 65,000 people, and the development of the
adjacent Beaufort Sea, the other great area in the offshore frontier with
the promise of petroleum and natural gas for a nation that has been so
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